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Relations on the set of economic agents are natural social constrainte with respect
to individual and social behaviour of those agents. Although the society consista
of a complex system of such relations and networks based on these relations, auch
a relational structure is until now not used in general equilibrium theory. One of
the main reasons is that auch relations are determining the social behaviour of the
economic agents, which is not yet described properly, especially in environments
with infinitely many agents.
In this paper we introduce a method for describing an economy with a com-
munication or relational structure, instead of a unstructured set of agents. Such
a communication structure consists of a set of agents endowed with relations as
the social characteristics of those agents. Furthermore we introduce a topolog,ical
attribute space. By typifying agents of the population in the attribute space we ar-
rive at a model which explains relations between agents locally. This is the explicit
formal expresaion of the fundamental thought in social sciences that social relationa
between individual agents are interdependent with the individual characteristice of
those agents.1 Introduction
In general equilibrium theory the economy in which a competitive equilibrium can
be defined, is usually described by a mapping from the set of agents into some space
of individual attributes. The chosen attributes are e.g. preferences on the commod-
ity space, initial endowments, and production possibility sets. Such a mapping is
assumed to be a complete description of the economy, and contains all necessary
information for defining the equilibrium concept, which is based on specific be-
haviourial assumptions on the individual agents. It naturally follows that in such
a setting of a market system this individual behaviour is oriented by the prices on
the markets in the system. The equilibrium price that results, may be considered
as information about scarcity of commodities. It is in fact the only social param-
eter in the model. For exhaustive expositions of this model we refer to Debreu
(1959), Hildenbrand (1974), and Mas-Colell (1985). The chosen atttibute space is
extensively studied in Grodal (1974).
In this paper we will introduce social aspects within the society already
ezplicitly in the definition of an economy. In some recent literature this is also done
in a more implicit way. Hammond (1987) and Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders
(1987) incorporate implicitly the social rule that in coalition formation only finite
coalitions are allowable. They however do not base themselves explicitly on the
attributes of the agents in the economy. Grodal (1972) also implicitly assumes that
there is some interdependency between the (social) determinants in the process of
coalition formation and the individual attributes of the agents.
We concern ourselves with a more explicit introduction of social aspects.
Traditionally one can introduce those aspects in two explicit forms, namely in coali-
tional etructurea and in relationalor communication atructurea. For coalitional ap-
proaches we refer to the seminal paper by Aumann and Drèze (1974) and the recent
work of Gilles (1987 and 1988a). In this paper we follow the relational approach.
In order to introduce these social aspects properly we depart from two primi-
tive economic concepts: a set of agents with a communication structure, and a space
of attributes of these agents. Both concepts can be regarded independently of each
other, but in real life they are related, of course. People, for example, who are char-
acterized by speaking the same language usually communicate more easily than
people who speak different languages. Similar observations can be made for people
1living close to each other, or who are working in the same factory. (A nice applica-
tion of this idea is given by Allen (1982) in the theory of accepting innovations by
producers in a communication structure.)
In the traditional approach to economic modelling the diatinetion between
the two primitive concepts is not relevant. There it is assumed that the agents are
endowed with a complete communication structure. Eventual characteristica based
on incomplete abilities to communicate, and thus pointing to a social communica-
tion structure, are just ignored. The result is that a model designer is forced to
choose all characteristics such that agents can be treated symmetrically. This is
one of the main reasons that there does not exist a general equilibrium model of a
production economy with oligopolistic firms in the market.
In our modelling we will explicitly choose for an asymetric treatment of
the agenta in a communication structure. In the main atream of literature on
communication structurea one treats agents symmetrically by introducing stochastic
concepts into the model. (We refer to the work of Greenberg and Weber (1983), and
Kirman et al. (1986) on atochastic communication structures.) Our approach will
be more in the line of a seminal paper by Kalai et al. (1978). In this line of reasoning
the distinction between a set of agents with a communication structure and a apace
of characteristics becomes relevant. In those specific, deterministic environments
agents cannot be treated symmetricly. If, for example, the characteristic "language"
ia relevant for the problem to be analysed, it is evident that agents speaking the same
language can be treated symmetrically, or can communicate with each other, while
agents speaking only very different languagea cannot. However, if the languagea
are not too different from each other, there may be agents in both language groups
who can understand each other and do communicate. This rather subtle relation
between agents and their characteristics will be defined formally in the sequel.
In order to do so, we express the two primitive economic concepts in mathe-
matical objecta. Following common reasoning in the main stream literature on the
relational approach we represent the communication structure by a grnph, while
the characteristics are represented by a topological attribute apace. Since we want
to emphasize the difference between the more vague economic concepts and the
exact notions used further, we will denote them by using the terms "population"
and "attribute space". The relation mentioned above is defined as a mapping from
the population into the attribute space. It is not evident at all, whether such a
2mapping, called a characterization, exists. If it exists, we are able to typify agents
in a population by their attributes. An element in the attribute apace is then called
a type. This paper is concerned with reciprocal relations between agents and tyges.
We derive properties about types from properties about agents, and vice versa.
In the second section of this paper we will formally develop our method of modelling
as described above. After the formal introduction of the notions of population, at-
tribute space, and characterization, we analyse as the major feature of the model
the concept of communication in an incomplete communication structure. We dis-
tinguish two kinds of communication, namely direct communication and a weaker
form of "regular" communication. Direct communication is a form of direct contact
between agents in the population, while regular communication is a form of contact
through finitely many intermediairy agent.
It is commonly assumed that in an economy every agent has to be able
to reach every other agent in the economy through this regular form of (indirect)
communication. If this is not the case, then we have a situation of several aep-
arate economies, consisting of groups of agents who can communicate with each
other. However there is no communication between theae separate groups of eco-
nomic agents, and hence there is no natural communication between these separate
economies. Therefore they can be analysed separately. A substantial part of our
analysis in this paper is therefore devoted to the question under which conditions
on the characterization of a population in an attribute space, there is (regular)
communication between all agents in the population. A first step in this analyais
is already made in the Section 2 of this paper. There it is atated that this kind of
full communication is equivalent to connectedness of types in the attribute space.
In the third section we introduce a special kind of characterizations of pop-
ulations in suitable attribute spaces. Our principle in this kind of modelling is that
in case of an at most countable population we are able to understand and use the
communication structure directly in the modelling of certain features, such as co-
operative behaviour. (See also Gilles (1988b).) We therefore do not demand that a
characterization of such a population in some attribute apace has to satisfy that it
reducea the communication structure. It is still simple enough to use it directly in
our analysis. However in the case of an uncountable population, describing situa-
tions that occur in the analysis of large economies, it is very problematic to uee the
3communication structure directly, without using certain instrumenta. In our case we
introduce a global condition on the characterization auch that the communication
structure is indeed reduced to a handable size.
In the setting of these kind of "large" populations the problem of full (regu-
lar) communication completely reduces to connectedness of certain clusters of types.
These cluaters, which we will call macro-typea, emerge naturally from the character-
ization of the population, satisfying this global condition. Thus we have introduced
a natural form of aggregation of types within the setting of our method of mod-
elling. It is this kind of aggregation that is the crux of economic analysis. It makes
it possible to understand complex economic problems, since it reduces them to a
comprehensable level. In our case that level ia the level of macro-types. In the case
of at moat countable populations this level is identical with the "higher" level of
(micro-) types. Our results show that on this low level we are well able to atudy the
problem of full communication in large economies with incomplete communication
structures.
Another notion of communication is introduced finally in Section 4. We ob-
serve that in daily economic life, there exist certain coalitions of economic agenta
which are h~ndling certain information streama, services and~or commodities. They
form the basic particles of the organization structure of the economy. In this pa-
per we introduce a collection of coalitions in the population, which satiafy some
minimal set of certain social conditions for being able to perform auch tasks as
described above. Since the members of thia collection only satisfy a minimal aet
of conditions, they are only potentially performera of these taska. We thereíore
implicitly deacribe potential organization atructurea of economies with incomplete
communication structures, called networba.
The main problem which ie (partially) solved in this paper is that this set
of minimal social conditions does not lead to an empty collection of potential or-
ganization structures on the economy. We show that for regular cases our set of
social conditions does not lead to this problem, i.e., there exist coalitiona which
satisfy these conditions. In a subsequent paper by Gilles, Ruys and Shou Jilin
(1989) we prove that also in pathological economies these conditiona do not lead to
contradictions.
We conclude this paper with a section in which we describe aome applicationa
of our method of modelling and some future lines of research.
42 Populations and Typifications
This section deals with the foundations of our model, and the first step in the
description of the process of modelling economies with an incomplete communica-
tion structure. It is therefore necessary to describe the economic primitive notions
of the model, and to begin with a basic analysis of the model. As stated in the
introduction it is our purpose to extend the traditional procedure to describe eco-
nomic agents with the use of certain attributes to the case of incomplete or limited
communication between those economic agents.
Our first economic primitive notion is that of a population. It consists of a set
of economic agents in the economy endowed with a structure of social relationships
between the members of the population. Thus a population is a socially structured
class of economic agents. We choose to describe a population with a deterministic
graph. Hence, we assume that in a static context relations between economic agents
have to be given. Moreover every economic agent knows exactly his or her abilities
and possibilities to communicate with other agents in the population. In fact we
explicitly assume a situation of complete information of the agent with respect
to the relational structure of the population. In our opinion it is not proper to
describe such a relational structure by means of a stochastic concept. This leads to
the following definition of a population:
DeBnition 2.1 A pair (A, R) ia a population if
. A ia a~et of economic agenta ;
. R c A x A ia a aymmetric and refíexive relation on the aet of agenta .,4.
It is clear that a population - or relational atructure - is an undirected graph. In
this paper we will assume that this graph can be as well finite as infinite, especially
uncountable. In the uncountable case this description forms an alternative for the
measure theoretic description of a mass of economic agenta. Furthermore we note
that in the finite case it does not degenerate to a trivial structure as it is the case
with a measure theoretic description. In the graph theoretic description all features
of the communication structure remain distinguishable.
We remark that the vertices in the graph describe the economic agents in the
population, while the edges of the graph are describing dírect relationships between
5those economic agents. In our opinion a direct relation is a very strong form of
communication, namely one knows how to reach that agent directly. A weaker form
of communication is that one can reach another agent in the population through a
chain of other economic agents of which one has a direct relationehip with the first
of those agents. This leads to the following definition.
Deflnition 2.2 Let (A,R) be a population. Then two agenta a,Q E A are able
to communicate if there exiata a finite aequence ryl, ..., ryn E.A, where n ia aome
integer, auch that
~ 7i-a;
~ ryn - Q i
~(7„ ry~}1) E R for every j - 1, ..., n- 1.
The above described principle of (regular) communication is based on the observa-
tion that one is only able to send a message to another agent if one is in finite reach
of this other agent, i.e., one can reach the other agent within a finite number of
steps or "handshakes". In a given population (A,R) it is obvious that it is known
with which agents one is able to communicate directly and in this way to have
access to communication with a larger collection of agents in the population. (This
is a natural consequence of our full information assumption.)
We note that the notion of direct communication is defined in the context
of a population. In the sequel we shall introduce some other concepts describing
the same social phenomenon, but defined in the context of derived constructions
of a population. These other concepts are basically similar to the above notion of
communication in the setting of a population.
In case of limited abilities of communication of economic agents, i.e., when the com-
munication structure is incomplete, we explicitly state that those agents have as
well individual characteristics as social characteristics. We note that these social
characteristics of a certain economic agent are just his or her possibilities of com-
municating (directly) with other agents in the economy. In the case of a complete
communication structure these social characteristics are not identifiable. However
in the case of an incomplete communication structure they are significant and con-
tribute substantially to the description of agents in the population.
6In order to describe these characteristics, as well individual as social, we
introduce another primitive concept, namely a collection of attributea. By attributea
we understand abstract characteristics or abstractions of characteriatics. In real life
one is endowed with certain quantities of commodities, with certain qualitiea. If
we model such an agent we abstract from a too large a variety of qualities and
define an endowment as a vector of quantities of a finite number of commodities.
Hence we construct an attribute, which is an abstraction of certain characteristics
of the agents in the population. Secondly we only conatruct those attributes which
are relevant and suitable for the problem at hand. So we arrive at a collection of
auitable attributea.
These suitable attributes therefore consist of individual attributes such as
(production) capacities, preferences, and endowments as well as social or socialized
attributes such as language, institutional membership, and place of living. Mathe-
matically we represent the collection of all tuples of attributes by some topological
space satisfying some (topological) separation property. In traditional general equi-
librium theory it is common practice to represent such a collection by a metric or
metrizable space. For an exposition of this theory we refer to Grodal ( 1974) and
Hildenbrand (1974).
Deflnition 2.3 A topological apace (C, r) ia called an attribute space if it aatiafiea
the Tl-aepamtion property, i.e., for every two pointa x,y E C, auch that x~ y, there
exiata an open aet V E T auch that (x E V and y~ V) or (y E V and x~ V~.
Note that by this definition we do not exclude Hausdorff or metric apaces to be
attribute spaces. Hence, this definition also includes the procedure as practised in
traditional general equilibrium theory. There the attribute space (C, r) is taken to
be the metrizable space P x E~. In this expression i is the number of commodities
in the economy, and so the non-negative orthant of the l-dimensional Euclidean
space E~ ia the commodity apace of the economy. Furthermore P is the space of all
preference relations on the commodity space E~. Now the relevant attributes for
describing the agents in this economy, and therefore for the analysis of a general
equilibrium, are contained in the space P x Et.
The fundamental problem in empirical and theoretical economics is the queation
whether it is possible to describe the agents in the population (A, R) with the use
7of a suitable collection of attributes as described in some attribute space (C,r). In
the case of an incomplete communication structure as well the individual as the
social characteristics of the agents in the population have to be described by these
attributes.
This problem of describing a population with an incomplete communication
structure is translated in the following definition of a characterization. It expresses
the basic principle that the agents in the population can sufficiently be described
by the choice of a suitable attribute space. Mostly the description, i.e., the charac-
terization, and the choice of the attribute space depend heavily on each other and
on the problem to be analysed.
DeBnition 2.4 Let (A, R) be a population and let (C, r) be an attribute apace. A
mapping g : A--~ C ia a characterization of (A, R) in (C, r) if it aatiafiea the
following propertiee:
(i) For every point a E g(A) there exiets an open neighbourhood U, E r auch that
b E Ua n g(A) ~(a,b) E R
where R:- {(x, y) E C x C ~ ~(a,Q) E R euch that x- g(a) and y- g(~0)}.
(ii) For every point a E g(..4) and every pair of agente a,~3 E g-1(a) there exieta
a finite eequence ryl,...,-yn E g-'(a), where n ia a natural number, auch that
~ o-7i;
~ N - ~Í'n i
~(7i~7if1) E R for every j - 1,...,n - 1.
The pair (A, R) ía called a typiflcation of the population (A, R) in the attribute
epace (C, r) under the charncterization g: A --~ C if A- g(A) C C and R-
{(x,y) E C x C ~ 3(o,~Q) E R euch that x - g(a) and y- g(~i)}. If (A,R) ia a
typification of (A, R) in (C, r), then the points in A C C are called types.
A typification is in fact a described or characterized population in some suitable
attribute space, while the definition of the characterizationitself expresses the prin-
ciple that we can describe a population by a suitable collection of attributes. The
mere existence of such a mapping expresses the requirement that the attribute space
S(C, r) is rich enough to describe the communication structure that is considered rel-
evant for the problem in study. The conditions as formulated in Definition 2.4 just
are the minimal properties that such a description has to satisfy.
Property 2.4 (i) states the basic principle that social relations can partially
be inferred from attributes that describe the individual characteristics of the agents
in a population. If two agents are "close" enough in terms of their attributes,
then they should be socially related. This basic point is also made by Grodal
(1972) in which she defines a core concept which is fully based on this principle
applied to coalition formation. The property as given in the definition explicitly is
a description of an interdependency óetween social and individual characteristics of
agents in the population. The condition that neighbouring types in the typification
should also be socially "close" to each other, is therefore an explicit expression of
a well established principle in economic modelling.
The second property as defined in 2.4 describes the very nature of a type. It
states that agents of the same type can communicate with each other thmugh each
other. In this case we assume that we choose the collection of attributes such that
agents who are described in the same way, i.e., who are indistinguiahable in this
particular typification, are also a aocial group. This condition seems demanding a
lot of the characterization, but it also seems quite natural.
We note that in the standard case of complete communication, these con-
ditions are trivially satisfied. This is mostly also the case for a finite population.
(For these finite cases any attribute space with enough points will do.) We illus-
trate the definition above by refering to common practice in general equilibrium
theory, where an economy is defined as a mapping E : A~ P x Et. All agents
are described by their preference, given by a member of P, and their endowments,
given by a point in the commodity space E~. So we are describing the economy
with use of a typification, where E is the characterization of that typification. In
such models one is not dealing with the agents themselves, but only with the types,
and hence with the typification.
In the sequel we will only consider populations (A, R) which can be described or
characterized in some attribute space (C, r). We remark that a typification of a
certain population does not have to be an exhaustive deacription. Usually the
model designer chooses a limited collection of relevant attributes for the problem
9to be studied. However an appropriate description always satisfies the minimal
conditions as stated in Definition 2.4. Next we study some aspects of communication
in populations, which can be described in a typification.
Deflnition 2.5 Let ( A,R) be a population, which can be characterized in the at-
tribute epace (C, r) by the typification (A, R).
The mapping F: A-~ 2A, which as~igna to every type a E A the aet
F(a) :- {b E A ~(a, b) E R}
ia called the type-relation mapping of (A, R).
The definition above gives a mapping, which for every type a E A, the set F(a) is
describing the collection of related typea of a in the typification (A, R). The next
result states some fairly trivial properties of the tools as developed above.
Proposition 2.6 Let (A, R) be a population, and let (A, R) be a typification of
that population in the attribute apace (C, r). Then:
(a) R C A x A ia a refiexive and ~ymmetric relation on the collection of typea A.
(b) For every type a E A it holda that a E int(F(a)), where the interior ia taken
with reapect to the reatricted attribute apace (A,r~A) with r~A :- {E(lA ~ E E
r}.
(c) For every two typee a, 6 E A it hold~ that a E F(b) if and only if b E F(a).
(d) For every type a E A, the collection F(a) ía a cloaed aet of the reatricted
attribute epace (A, r~A) if and only if for every two typea a, b E A it holda that
if (a,b) ~ R, then there exiata an open neighbourhood Ua E r~A of a auch that
for every c E UQ: (b, c) ~{ R.
PROOF
(a) Reflexivity
Let a E A and let a E g-1(a) C A. Now it is obvious that (a,a) E R and so
by definition of R it holds that (a,a) E R.
Symmetry
Let (a, b) E R. Then there exist a E g-'(a) and ~i E g-1(b) such that
(n„Q) E R. Now by symmetry of R it holds that (~Q, a) E R and so by
definition (b, a) E R.
10(b) This property directly follows from the definition of a typification. For every
type a E A there exists an open neighbourhood in r~A which is contained in
the set F(a).
(c) This is evident.
(d) Only if
Let (A, R) satisfy the property as given in the assertion, so F is a point-
closed mapping. Now if for every type a E A it holds that F(a) - A, then
it is obvious that the assertion is satisfied. Hence assume that for at least
one type a E A it holds that F(a) ~ A. Then we can take b E A such that
(a, b) ~ R. (Symmetry)
Then by definition a~ F(b), and hence by closedness of F(b) there exists an
open neighbourhood Ua E r of a, such that Ua n F(b) - 0.
If
Let (A, R) satisfy the property as stated in the assertion, and let a E A. Now
suppose we can take a type b~ F(a), then by definition (a, 6) ~ R. So there
exists an open neighbourhood U6 E T of b such that Ub n F(a) - 0. This
implies that A`F(a) - ~J{ U6 n F(a) ~ b~ F(a)} is an open set, and so F(a)
has to be a closed set in the restricted attribute space (A,r~A) .
Q.E.D.
With the tools as developed in the previous proposition and the previous definitions
we now can give an exact description of "full" communication in the sense of Defi-
nition 2.2. With this notion of full communication we do not describe a situation of
a complete communication structure in graph theoretic sense, but a situation that
all agents in the population are able to communicate regularly with each other in
the sense of Definition 2.2.
The next definition gives an equivalent formulation of this notion of complete
communication in the setting of a typification. The next theorem confirms that
connectedness of the typification is indeed equivalent to complete communication
in the corresponding population. (We refer to Definition 5 of the appendix for the
technical definition of an irreducible chain in a topological space, and note that we
denote by J1Í the collection of all non-negative integers.)
11Deflnition 2.7 Let (A, R) 6e a population and let (A, R) be a typification of that
population in the attribute apace (C,r). Then the typification (A,R) ia type-
connected if for every two typea a, b E A there exiata a finite aequence of typea
cl, ..., c„ E A, with n E J~Í, euch that the aeta F(cl), ..., F(c„) C A form an ir-
reducible chain between F(a) and F(b) in the reatricted attribute apace (A,r~A)
The notion of type-connectedness describes a situation in which one can reach
from one agents related types to another agents related types in a finite number of
handshakes. Moreover the properties of an irreducible chain imply that one does
not have to make detours in reaching other types.
The first main result of this paper states that it can be proved that the
derived notion of type-connectedness is equivalent to the basic notion of regular
communication in the setting of a population.
Theorem 2.8 Let (A, R) be a population and let (A, R) be a typification of that
population in the attribute apace (C, r). Then the following aaaertiona are equivalent:
1. (A, R) ia type-connected ;
t. For every two typea a,b E A there exiata a finite aequence of typea, denoted by
cl, ..., c„ E A, auch that
~ c~-aandc„-b;
~ for every j - 1,...,n - 1 it holda that c~~l E F(c~) ;




Take two types a, b E A. Now by the definition of type-connectedness there exists a
finite sequence cl, ..., c„ E A of types such that cl - a, c„ - b, and F(cl), ..., F(c„)
form an irreducible chain between F(a) and F(b) in the restricted attribute space
(A,r~A) .
Hence we can construct a finite sequence al, .., azi-1 E A in the following way:
~ For j E {1, . . . , n}: a2j-1 - c~ ;
12~ For j E{1,...,n - 1} take any aa~ E F(c~) n F(c~tl) ~~.
From this construction it easily follows that al - cl - a and that azi-1 - cn - b.
The second wndition of 2, as stated in the theorem, fohows from the definition of
this sequence and also by noting that
1. for j - 1, ..., n it holds that a2j-1 - c~ E F(aa~), since as~ E F(c~) and F is
symmetric in the sense of the proposition above.
2. for j - 1, ..., n - 1 it follows that aa~ E F(c~~l ) - F(a2~f1).
2. implies 3.
Take two agents a,p E A. Now we can distinguish two cases.
Case I: g(a) - g(~i) - a E A.
Then by Definition 2.4 a and ~0 are able to commmunicate within g-1(a) C A.
Case II: g(a) - a~ b- 9((j).
Now by application of assertion 2 it follows that there ezists a aequence
cl, ..., c„ E A such that cl - a, c„ - b, and c~ E F(c~~l ) for every j E
{1,...,n - 1}.
Hence we can construct the following finite sequence between the two agents
~ and (3, which satisfies all necessary properties of communication in the sense
of Definition 2.2.
Choose 7~ , y~ E A( j - 1, ... , n) such that:
~(ry~,y~~l) E R for every j E{1,...,n - 1} ;
. g(7~ ) - g(ry~ ) - c~ for every j E {1, . . . , n - 1 } ;
' 7i - a and 7n - A.
Such a sequence can indeed be constructed according to the properties of
C1,...,C,i.
Since by construction for every j E{1, ... , n} it follows that ry~ , 7~ E g-1(c~),
and hence by application of Definition 2.4 there ezists a finite sequence of
agents, denoted by bi, ..., bk~ E g-1(c~), such that the following properties
are satisfied:
13. bi i .
i - 7i ,
. bi z .
k; - ry~ ,
.(b;,b;~l) E R for every i E{1,...,k; - 1}.
Now the union of all sequences bi ,..., bk~ , where j ranges from 1 to n, is also
a finite sequence in (A, R) which satisfies all desired properties.
3. implies 1.
Let a, b E A be two types. Moreover let a E g-~(a) and Q E g-1(b) be two agents
of those types.
Now by assertion 3 there exists a finite sequence ryl, ..., ry„ E A such that ryl - a,
ry„ -~Q, and for every j - 1, ..., n- 1 it holds that (ry;, ry;t, ) E R.
Next let {cl, ... , ck} :- g({ryl, ...,-y„}) C A be the image of this sequence in the
typification ( A,R). (Note that k C ~n.) We can order this finite sequence in A such
that cl - a, ck - b, and for every j - 1, ..., k - 1 it holds that (c;, c;f3 ) E R.
It can easily be established that F(cl), ..., F(ck) is a chain between F(a) and F(b).
(Note that this chain does not necessarily have to be an irreducible chain.) Since
this chain is finite, we evidently can take a finite subcollection {d~, ..., d,,,} C
{cl, ..., ck}, with m G k, which generates an irreducible chain between F(a) and
F(b). This proves the type-connectedness of the typification (A, R).
Q.E.D.
3 Typologies
As one can see, a typification of a population (A, R) in a certain attribute space
(C, r) has the specific property that the topological structure of the attribute space
describes the relations between the economic agents Iceally. The assumptions as
made in Definition 2.4 refer to this local description of characteristics, as well indi-
vidual as social, by the characterization in the attribute space (C, r).
In the case of an at most countable population these conditions are mostly
satisfied, and therefore trivial. It is our assumption that in those cases one can
easily analyse the graph theoretic structure of the population, and therefore all
social characteristics of the economic agents in the population. In those cases it is
not necessarily clarifying that certain attributes "explain" social relations between
individual agents.
14However in the case of an uncountable population the properties of a typifi-
cation are no longer trivially satisfied. Then these conditions on the characterization
state that locally we can infer the social relati~ns bPtween agents in the population
from a suitable set of attributes. The technical reason for this important property
is that one cannot understand an uncountable graph anymore, unless one uses addi-
tional techniques, such as the technique of description, as developed in the previous
section, or a randomization of the graph as is done in Kirman, Oddou and Weber
(1986). The uncountable case seems however very important for the theory of large
economies, coalition formation in such economies, and perfect competition as is
sketched in Gilles and Ruys (1988) and Gilles (1988a).
The next example shows that we are however able to construct typifications
of populations in an attribute space with a non-trivial topology, in which these
properties of the characterization become meaningless. In those cases the intuitive
economic interpretation of those "local" properties is no longer valid, and hence
we get an economically trivial characterizatíon of the population. (By triviality we
mean in this case that the characterization does not explain anything on the social
characteristics of the agents in the population by the suitably chosen collection of
attributes. It is obvious that such a characterization does not satisfy the economic
foundations of our method of modelling.)
Example 3.1
In this example we construct the following class of populations: Take A:- I- [0,1],
and let R C I x I be any reflexive and symmetric relation on A- I. It ie obvious
that (A, R) is a population. Next take the attribute space to be the set C :- I~,
endowed with the product topology r emerging from the Euclidean topology on
the unit interval I. So (C,T) is a compact Hausdorff space and hence an attribute
space.
Next we construct a characterization of (A,R) in (C,T) by defining the mapping
g: A---~ C which is given by g(a) :- fQ, for a E A- I, where fQ : I-~ I
is defined as fQ(a) - 1, and fa(~3) - 0, Q~ a. Obviously this mapping is a
characterization of (A,R) in (C,T).
However it is also obvious that the typification, which results from this characteriza-
tion, is trivial in the sense that it does not satisfy the intuitive economic foundation
of our modelling that the chosen attributes describe as well the individual as the
15social characteristics of the agents in the population. In this case the social char-
acteristics are not described or reduced by the description, i.e., the social structure
of the typification is evenly complicated as the original population. (We have not
gained by describing the agents.) This is illuatrated by noting that for every type
a E I there exists a neighbourhood U, E r such that (Ua `{a}) f1 g(I) -(~.
From the example above it is clear that we want to restrict ourselves to a subclass
of non-trivial typifications instead of the large class of typifications itself. Therefore
we have to introduce an additional condition on the global structure of a typification,
which makes those properties of the local structure of the typification economically
non-trivial.
Before we state this global property we make some conventions for shortening
the statement of the next definitions and results. In the sequel we assume that we
have a fixed population (,A, R) and a fixed attribute space (C, r). Furthermore we
assume that we can characterize this population in this attribute space by some
characterization g : A--~ C. Mostly we will denote a typification of (.A, R) in
(C, r) by (A, R).
We are now able to formulate the additional condition on the global structure
of a typification. A typification, which satisfies this additional property, is called a
typology.
DeSnition 3.2 A typification (A, R) of the population (A, R) in the attríbute apace
(C, r) ia a typology of (A, R) in (C, r) if there exieta an at moat countable aeguence
(cn)nEN of topologically connected aubaeta of the reatricted attribute epace (A,r~A)
auch that A - U„o1 Cn.
Note that this additional condition excludes typifications such as constructed in
the example. From mathematics we learn that as a consequence of this additional
property there exists a unique, at most countable sequence of components of the
restricted attribute space (A,r~A) . (A component of a topological space is defined
as a mazimal connected subset of that topological space. See also the appendix.)
We remark that these components of A are pairwise disjoint, and we will denote
them by (An)nEN. This unique sequence of components will be called the aubdiviaion
oí (A, R).
We now know that if we assume that there exists a typology of a population
in some suitable attribute space, then there is always a non-trivial description of
16"closenessn of agents by refering to their types. So neighbouring types in the typol-
ogy are now always close in the social structure of the population itself. This also
means that the description or characterization in a typology always is economically
meaningful. We remark that the choice of the attribute space, or the collection of
relevant attributes, determines the typology.
But evenly important is that it is a natural conaequence that we have de-
scribed the population by an at most countable number of collections of topolog-
ically neighbouring types. In economic terms we will call these collections macro-
type~. This unique subdivision of the collection of (micro-) types into macro-types
is a natural form of aggregation. By describing agents in an incomplete communi-
cation structure with the use of a suitable collection of attributea we "naturally"
get a subdivision into macro-types, describing some kind of discrete characteristic.
The assumption that thie is possible, is one of the fundamental axioms of
social sciences, especially economics. Although this axiom is never stated explicitly,
it is used very frequently. One of the most trivial examplea is the definition of total
demand and supply on a market as the sum - or, more general, the integral - of
individual demand and supply. If we have a theory, which is giving a description
of a(micro-) type, then with the use of a typology we get a very informative
construction. This can be compared with the parametrization of a function: only
in case of a finite parametrization it is interesting to use it as a deacription. In this
case in fact we get a class-structure in the population. (Formally: Let (A„)„E~ be
the unique subdivision of the typology (A, R) of (A, R) in (C, r), then for every
n E JV, the subset g-1(A„) C A is a claaa of agenta of the aame macro-type.)
For the reasons mentioned above, we call the requirement that a population
can be characterized in a typology, i.e., representing agents into types, which can
be exhaustively be aggregated to an at most countable number of macro-types, an
axiom of descriptive modelling.
Axiom of Descriptive Modelling
For every population (A, R) there exists a typology (A, R) in a auitable attribute
space (C, r).
The first implication of this axiom is that one of the main tasks of descriptive
economics is to find this "suitable" attribute space and therefore a auitable char-
acterization for some empirical problem. It is the art of the designer of economic
17models to choose the attributes suitably. In this paper we will not address this
problem.
The second implication is that our form of regular communication, as defined
in Definition 2.2, can be guaranteed within the components of the typology. This
is illustrated by the following results on equivalent atatements of communication in
typologies. To state these results properly we assume that we have a fixed popula-
tion (A, R) which, by the axiom of descriptive modelling, can be characterized in
some suitable attribute space (C, r). Hence, if we call a pair (A, R) "a typology",
we mean to say that (A, R) is a typology of (.A, R) in this attribute space (C, r).
The next definition describes a way of reducing a typology to the bare global
structure by describing relations between macro-types only.
Deflnition 3.3 Let (A,R) be a typology, and let (A„)nE,v be ita unique aubdiviaion
into componenta. A pair (A, R), with A C C and R C A x A, ia a condensation of
(A, R) if there exiata a aurjective mapping C: A~ À which aatiaftea the following
propertiea:
1. for any n E J1i and any pair of typea a, b E A„ it holda that C(a) - C(b) ;
~. for any two integera n, m E J`i, n~ m, and any two typea a E A„ and 6 E A,,,
it holda that C(a) ~ C(b) ;
9. (á, 6) E R if and only if there exiat integera n, rn E.IV, n~ m,, and two typea
a E A„ and 6 E A,,, auch that
. C(a) - á ;
. C(b) - b ;
. (a, 6) E R.
The previous definition gives a construction of an at most countable graph, describ-
ing the bare macro-type structure of a typology. The condensation of a typology
just describes all external relations between the components or macro-types in the
typology. We now define another form of connectedness, in terms of relations be-
tween macro-types only, and thus specifically in the setting of a typology instead
of a typification, as is the case in the previous section. Again we note that these
constructions become trivial in case of an at most countable population.
18Definition 3.4 A typology (A, R) ia component-connected íf there exiata a con-
densation (A, R) of (A, R) which ia a finitely connected grnph, i.e., for every two
pointa á, b E A there exiata a finite aequence c, ,..., c„ E A (n E.~) such that
cl - á, c„ - b, and for every j E{ 1, ... , n- 1} it holda that (c„ cj}1) E R.
We remark that component-connectedness is quite a natural condition on typolo-
gies. It just prescribes that there exist communication linea between all macro-
types. Hence in the class-structure of the population there exists communication
between classes, and so no class is socially isolated.
The next result links the notion of type-connectedness of a typification with
the above concept of component-connectedness. Since any typology is a typification,
as defined in Definition 3.2, a typology can also be type-connected. In combination
with the main result of the previous section we therefore have also made a link with
the notion of regular communication in populations, as defined in Definition 2.2.
Theorem 3.b Let (A, R) 6e a typology. Then ( A, R) ia type-connected if and only
if (A, R) ia component-connected.
PROOF
Let (A„)„EN denote the unique subdivision of (A, R). Moreover let the pair (A, R)
be a condensation of (A, R), and let C be the mapping as defined in Definition 3.3.
Now decribe the set Á as follows: A -{á„ E A ~ à„ - C(A„) for n E J1~}.
If
Suppose that (A, R) is component-connected. For the proof that all types are
connected in the sense of type-connectedness we need the following claim:
CLAIM
For any integer n E J1Í, every pair of types a, b E A„ is connnected, i.e.,
there exists a finite sequence (cl, ..., ck) in A„ such that cl - a, ek - b, and
(c„ c~~l ) E R for every j- 1, ..., k- 1, and moreover for every (j- h~ ~ 1 it
holds that (c„ ch) ~ R.
Proof of the claim
Apply lemma (10.3.8) of Császàr (1978) - see also the appendix - on the
sets F(a), F(b) as subsets of the connected subspace An of the restricted
19attribute apace (A, r~A) by taking as open covering of A,,, the collection B:-
{int(F(a)) ~ a E A„}. This lemma asserts the existence of an irreducible chain
of elements in B between F(a) and F(b).
Now let {F(d;) ~ j- 1, ..., m} be the collection which can derived from this
irreducible chain. Now by reordering and extending this collection we can
easily construct a sequence (cl, . .., ck) which is just the sequence as asserted
in the claim. The completes the proof of the claim.
To complete the proof of the if-part of the theorem we take two types a, 6 E A and
consider two cases:
Case I: There exists an integer n E J1Í such that as well a E An as b E A,,. Then
direct application of the claim asserts that a and 6 are connected in the sense
of type-connectedness.
Case II: There exist two distinct integers k, m E,A( such that a E Ak and b E A,,,.
By the definition of component-connectedness of (A, R) there exists a finite
aequence in A, say (bl, ..., bn), such that bl - ák, 6„ - à,,,, (b;, b;tl ) E R for
every j E {1, . .., n- 1}, and (b;, bh) ~ R if ~j- h~ ~ 1. Now we construct the
following sequence in A:
~ c;a E C-1(b;) for j - 1, ... , n- 1, and
c;l E C-1(b; ) for j- 2, ..., n such that
(cia~citi,i) E R for j- 1,...,n - 1;
(The existence of such pairs is guaranteed by Definition 3.3 and compo-
nent-connectedness. )
~ c,.z - b.
Now for every j E{1, ... , n} the claim asserts the existence of a finite sequence
of intermediate agents between c;l,c;z E C-~(b;) - A;, and thus by the fact
that (c;a, c;fl,l ) E R for j- 1, ..., n-1, the union of all these finite sequencea
is again a finite sequence, which is irreducible. Hence a and b are connected
in the sense of type-connectedness.
Only if
20Suppose that (A, R) is type-connected. Take two points á, 6 E A. We will show
that á and b are finitely connected within (A,R).
Take types a E C-i(á) and 6 E C-'(b), then by assumption a and b are connected in
the sense of type-connectedness. Hence there exists a finite sequence cl, ..., c„ E A
such that cl - a, c„ - b, and for every j E{ 1, ..., n-1} it holds that (c„ c~~l ) E R.
Now define {cl, ..., ck} :- C({cl, ..., c„}) C Á, with obviously k C n. Then we
can order this set such that cl - á, ck - 6, and for every j E{1, . .., k- 1} it holds
that (c„c~~l) E R.
Hence we have proved that (A, R) is finitely connected, and so (A, R) is component-
connected.
Q.E.D.
The next corollary links the theorem above with the main result of the previous
section. The proof is evident.
Corollary 3.8 Let (A, R) be a typology. Then the following atatementa are equiv-
alent:
(i) Eroery two agenta a,p E A are able to communicate within the population
(A~ R) -
(ii) (A, R) ia type-connected.
(iii) (A, R) ia component-connected.
The corollary above not only summarizes the results of our analysis of communi-
cation within a population satisfying the aziom of descriptive modelling, but also
illustrates the strength of this axiom with respect to reduction of properties to the
level of the condensation of a typology. Here communication is reduced to finitely
connectedness of the condensation as a graph.
4 Networks
In the previous sections we have developed a theory in which communication in a
typified population is analyzed. This analysis learns that in case of the axiom of
21descriptive modelling we can reduce the notion of regular communication, as intro-
duced in Definition 2.2, to the notion of links between macro-types in the setting
of the typology, called component-connectedness. In this section we introduce an-
other notion concerning communication, namely an organization structure of the
population, which can handle all communication in the population.
Our point of departure is the observation that in normal cases certain coali-
tions in a population take care of certain information streams, services, or com-
modities. For instance the class of physicians takes care of "health" of agents in
the population, while labour unions take care of conditions in working situations
and wages. All these kind of coalitions, with specific properties with respect to
communication and reachability, together form an organization structure of the
total population, and therefore of the whole economy. In fact the organization
structure as developed by these specific coalitions concerns all agents in the popu-
lation. Hence by describing these kind of coalitions, we are in fact also describing
an organization structure of the total economy.
In this section we introduce a collection of coalitions in the population,
which are potential candidates to be such special coalitions taking care of certain
services, or commodities. In fact we state a number of minimal conditions which
such a coalition has to satisfy, and so we construct a class of coalitions satisfying
these minimal conditions. A coalition satisfying these minimal conditions is called
a network within the population. We note that these minimal conditions only state
something on the communicative aspects of these networks. Hence, networks are
only potentia! candidatea for an actual organization structure.
To complete the description of those special coalitions we have to describe
a subclass of the collection of networks in the population, which satisfy additional
properties. These additional properties should concern the abilities or capacities
of the members in these networks, and therefore be based on the typology of the
population in a suitable attribute space. (This problem will not be addressed to in
this paper.)
Our starting point is the axiom of descriptive modelling. So in the statements of
the formal definition of networks we depart from a given population (A, R) and a
given suitable attribute space (C, r). Now we denote by ( A, R) a typology of (A, R)
in (C, r). We are now able to give a formal description of the notion of network as
22described above.
Deflnition 4.1 Let (A, R) be a typology.
A aet of typea N C A ia a network in (A, R) if it aatiafiea the following propertiea:
Reachability
{F(a) ~ a E N} ia a covering of A;
Connectivity
(N, R~N) ia type-connected aa a aubgraph of (A, R) in the aenae of Defini-
tion t.7, where R~N :- R fl (N x N) ;
Minimality
N ia a minimal collection in the aenae that for every member a E N, the
aubcollection N`{a} doea not aatiafy aa well the reachability property aa the
connectivity property.
The collection of all networka in the typology (A, R) will 6e denoted by iY(A, R), or
aimply by iY.
We note that in the definition above we describe a collection of types which satisfies
some properties with respect to communication only. Firstly, every (other) type can
reach a type in the network. Secondly, the network is internally completely com-
municative, i.e., every member can reach any other member within a finite number
of steps via network members only. Finally, a network satisfies a rudimentary ef~i-
ciency condition with respect that there is disposed of auperfluous "members„ who
are inessential for maintaining the two important properties of reachability and
connectivity. Hence all members are essential for maintaining theae properties of
the network as a whole.
Again we remark that the notion of network expresses a potential or latent
collection of types, which have the minimal aocial properties for handling exclusively
a certain information stream, service, or commodity. Hence it expresses a coalition
with the social position which fits for the períormance of such a task.
Secondly, the definition above describes a concept which can be used to
describe the organization structure of an economy. A certain suitable collection
of networks can form an organization structure, and may have great influence on
the behaviour of agents in this economy. In Gilles (1988b) it is described how to
23construct such potential organization structures from the networks in the popula-
tion. Moreover it is explained how one can derive from these structures an index
expressing the potential power of the agents in the population.
In this paper we will not address the question how to construct other properties
to arrive at a subcollection of networks, which will actually handle certain services
or commodities. Before we can solve that problem we have to answer the question
whether there exist networks. Here we will only solve this question for "normal"
cases. The next theorem states under which conditions iY ~ 0. For extensions of
this existence result we refer to Gilles, Ruys and Shou Jilin (1989), where also some
other network-like concepts are introduced.
Theorem 4.2 Lct (A, R) be a typology.
(a) If there exiata a network in (A, R), then (A, R) ia component-connected.
(b) If the reatricted attribute apace (A,r~A) ia compact, then there exiata a finite
network in (A, R) if and only if (A, R) ia component-connected.
PROOF
Proof of (a)
Let (A, R) be the condensation of the typology (A, R) and let C be the mapping
belonging to it. (See also Definition 3.3.) Now suppose that ~~~. We will prove
that (Á, R) is a finitely connected graph.
Define N :- C(N) C A. Obviously N is at most countable and finitely connected
within (Á, R), i.e., for every two points a, 6 E 1V there exists a finite sequence in
N, say ( cl, ..., c„), such that cl - a, c„ - 6, and for every j - 1, ..., n - 1 it holds
that (c„c~tl) E R. (Connectivity of the network.)
Take a, 6 E A, then by definition of a network there exist c, d E N such that
(a, c) E R and (b, d) E R. (Reachability) Moreover by the statement above, there
exists a finite sequence between c and d within N, say (aZ, ..., a„-1) with sa - c
and a„-1 - d. Now take al :- a and a„ :- 6, then by the property of connectedness
of the sequence between c and d, it follows that for every j E{ 1, . .., n- 1}:
(a~, 9~}1 ) E R. So we have proved that ( A, R) is a finitely connected graph.
24Proof of (b)1
Suppose that the restricted attribute space (A,r~A) is compact.
Since the "only if"-part of the proof is evident by application of assertion (a) to this
specific situation, we have only to concern ourselves with the proof of the "if"-part.
Suppose that (A, R) is component-connected, or, equivalently, type-connected.
Since (A,r~A) is compact, we know that the open covering, {U, E r~A ~ a E A},
where U, is chosen as an open neighbourhood of a E A such that (a, 6) E R for
all b E Ua, has a finite subcovering. (For the existence of such neighbourhoods we
refer to Definition 2.4 (ii).) Let denote the finite subset of types generating this
subcovering by W.
Next we define
Q:- {N C A ~ N is finite and satisfies reachability and connectivity }
First we show that Q~~.
It is clear that W C A is finite and satisfies reachability. Next define the mapping
0: W x W--- ~ 2A, where 0(a, b) is the finite set {cl, ..., c„} C A, which can be
ordered such that cl - a, c„ - b, and for every j E{1,...,n - 1} it holds that
(c~, c~~l ) E R. (The existence of such subsets is guaranteed by type-connectedness
of (A, R).)
Let ~:- ~J„EwXw 0(~). Now by the fact that W C ~ C A, and hence F(~) ~
F(W )- A, it is clear that ~ has to satisfy the reachability condition. Furthermore
by construction of ~, it also has to satisfy the connectivity asaumption. Moreover
we know that ~ is finite, and thus ~ E Q~ 0.
Take any totally ordered subcollection B of Q. ( The ordering of B is with respect
to inclusion.) It is clear that (1B is a lower bound of the collection B with respect
to inclusion, and that f1B ~~. From the finiteness assumption on Q it is also clear
that f1B E Q.
Now by application of Zorn's lemma there exists a minimal element in the collection
Q, say N'. Obviously this minimal set N' is finite. Moreover it satisfies reachability
and connectivity, and so it has to be a network in (A, R).
Q.E.D.
1We thank Shou Jilin for his helpïul eomments for the constrnction of this part of the proof.
255 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have developed a uniform and general method concerning the de-
scription of economic agents in an arbitrary communication structure. Our basic
assumptions were threefold. Firstly, we assumed that in a full information and
static context a deterministic graph is the best mathematical tool to describe such
(incomplete) communication structures. Secondly, we explicitly stated that we fol-
lowed the traditional method in descriptive economics by characterizing agents with
respect to a suitable collection of attributes. Thirdly, we assumed that social rela-
tionships, and therefore communication in the relational structure of a population,
are interdependent with the individual characteristics of the agent. (See also Grodal
(1972) defending the same principle.)
Basing our modelling on these three principles or axioms, we developed the
concept of a typification. Here the conditions on this construction as described
in Definition 2.4 are explicitly describing this third axiom on interdependency of
characteristics and relations between agents in the population. We remark that all
conditions as formulated in the definition of a typification are "localn.
With an example we however showed that a typification does not have to
express these economic principles, as described above, properly. We therefore in-
troduced an additional "global" property to secure this defect. Hence, we arrive
at the subcollection of typologiea. In this context we stated the second principle
as mentioned above, namely that any population can be described by a typology,
provided one takes the suitable collection of attributes. This principle and the belief
that one can find such a suitable collection of attributes, is the crux of economics,
as can be shown by refering to the existing literature.
In this paper we only gave the basic principles of modelling agents in an
arbitrary communication structure, and analyzed the basic properties of communi-
cation. We note that this analysis is only non-trivial in case of a large population,
e.g., the uncountable case. This case is however of great interest in the theory of
perfect competition, as is shown by Kirman et al. (1986).
Secondly, we introduced the concept of network in the setting of our model,
describing a coalition with potential power in the organization of information streams,
the organization of agents in the economy, and the handling of certain services
and~or commodities. We showed that in normal cases, i.e., in cases that the pop-
26ulation is at most a continuum, the collection of networks is always non-empty.
With the notion of network we introduced an efficient tool in the (future) analysis
of behaviour in the setting of incomplete communication str~~cturea. The explicit
potential power of a network can be used in the description of coalition formation,
social or relational constraints in non-cooperative behaviour, and naturally in co-
operative behaviour. Moreover it is possible to think of mixtures of both kinda of
behaviour, i.e., non-cooperative behaviour with threats of cooperative blocking.
Some answers to the main question after more general resulta on the exis-
tence of networks is given in Gilles, Ruys and Shou Jilin (1989). There it is ahown
that in nearly all situations there exist networks, while in every situation, even the
pathological ones, there exist network-like coalitions. A fundamental consequence
of these results is that we always can use networks freely in describing behaviour
of agents in situations with limited communication.
An application of the method as introduced in this paper on coalition formation ia
given in Gilles and Ruys (1988). There a way is sketched how to arrive at a model
of a large economy with a coalitional structure from a situation with an incomplete
communication structure. In auch a model with a coalitional structure the limita-
tions on communication are expressed in constraints in coalition formation. This
can be made explicit by using a model of coalition formation based on a typology
of a population as developed in this paper. An example is given where networka
are explicitly used as generators of these allowable, or truely feasible coalitions.
Networks and systems of networks are used in Gilles (1988b) to describe
possible organization structures in a finite economy with limitationa regarding com-
munication between agents. Based on these potential structures a power index is
derived, describing the power of the position of the agent in the communication
structure of the economy.
Finally we remark that all results and models as mentioned above indicate
the possibilities of developing equilibrium concepts, based on mixtures of cooper-
ative and non-cooperative elements in the behaviour of agents as is needed e.g.
in the theory of industrial organization. It is quite natural that incomplete com-
munication has consequences for as well non-cooperative as cooperative behaviour.
Future research will certainly focus on the consequencea of cooperative elementa in
non-cooperative equilibrium concepts. We think that methods auch as described in
27this paper will contribute to the foundations of these kind of models.
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29Appendix : Topological Spaces
In this appendix we will discuss some definitions and theorems as formulated in
Császàr (1978). For further elaborations of the topics as discussed here, we refer to
that textbook on general topology.
The pair (E, r) is called a topological space if E is a set of points and r is a
collection of subsets of E such that the empty set 0 E r and r is closed for taking
arbitrary unions and finite intersections. The elements in the collection r are called
open aeta in (E, r).
Let (E,r) be a topological space, and F C E. The interior of F, which we
denote by int(F), is the largest open set H E r such that H C F.
Deflnition 1 Let (E, r) 6e a topological space, and let x E E be a point in that
apace. A claaa of aets Vx C 2E is the neighbourhood system of x if it aatiafies
the following propertiea:
1. For every aet F E Vx, x E F.
t. If H E Vx and F~ H, then also F E V:.
9. If H ia an open aet and x E H, then H E Vx.
The elementa in the neighbourhood ayatem Vx of x are called neighbourhoods of
x in the topology r.
Deflnition 2 Let (E,r) 6e a topological space, and let V~ be the neighbourhood
ayatem of x E E. A claaa B C Vz of neighbourhooda ia a neighbourhood base of
x in r if it satiafiea the following propertiea:
1. ForeverysetFEB,xEF.
t. For every neighbourhood of x, H E Vs, there is a F E B auch that F C H.
3. For every two H, F E B with H n F~ ~, there exiata G E B auch that
GcHnF.
In the sequel we take a fixed topological space (E, r). For this fixed space we shall
derive some properties. We now come to one of the basic results of topology.
Theorem 3 Let x E E, and let Vs be ita neighbourhood syatem in r. Then the
claas of open neighbourhooda of x, Va n r ía a neighbourhood baae for Ve.
30We are now able to define the main topological tools which are needed in the proofs
of the theorems as developed in this paper.
Deflnition 4
(a) A aet F in the topological apace (E, r) ia connected if there do not exiat two
open aubaeta A, B E r auch that A n B n F-~ and (A U B) n F- F.
(b) A aet F in the topological apace (E,r) ia a component of (E,r) if F ia con-
nected and for every connected aet F C C C E it holda that F- C.
We remark that components of a topological space are just maximal connected
subsets in that space. The next definition is of major importance in the statements
on type-connectedness of typifications of populations in attribute spaces.
Deflnition 5 Let B, C C E be two aubaeta of the topological apace (E, r), and
let n E JV be a non-negative integer. A finite aequence of aubeeta in E, denoted
by Dl, ..., D„ C E, ia an irreducible chain between B and C if it aatiafiea the
following propertiea:
~ D1-BandD„-C;
~ for every number j- 1, ..., n- 1 it holda that D; n Dj}1 ~~;
~ for all numbera h and j with ~h - j~ ) 1 it holda that Dh n D; - 0.
For the next theorem we remind that a collection of open sets B C r is an open
cover of the topological space (E, r) if UB - E.
Theorem 8(( 10.3.8) of Csázsàr) Let C C E be a connected aet, B be an open
cover of the aet C, and A, B be two aubaeta of C auch that A~~~ B. Then there
exiata an irreducible chain between A and B conaiating of elementa of B.
We conclude this appendix by stating some definitions and results on connectednesa
and locally connectedness.
Deflnition 7 The topological apace (E, r) ia locally connected if every point
x E E haa a neighbourhood baae conaiating of connected aete only.
Theorem 8 A topological apace is locally connected if and only if ít haa a baae
conaiating of connected aeta only.
31Theorem 9((10.2.3) of Csázsàr) Any open aubapace of a locally connected apace
ia locally connected aa well.
We finally remark that a topological space (E, r) is compact if every open cover of
(E,r) has a finite subcover. Furthermore a topological space (E,r) is a continuum
if it is a compact and connected topological space. In the theory of large economies
one usually takes the space of agents to be a continuum.
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